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本文以2007~2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,将商誉减值作为并购绩效的考查指标,检验商誉减值与高管薪酬之间的关系。研究发现,唯有民营上市公司的商誉减值与高管薪酬显著负相关。进一步的研究发现,管理层权力显著降低了商誉减值与高管薪酬之间的负相关关系。由此得出结论,民营上市公司董事会在制定高管薪酬时会将商誉减值纳入业绩评价指标体系,据以调整高管薪酬,而管理层权力会对其产生抑制作用,即具有负向公司治理作用。
Abstract：Based on a sample of listed A-share Chinese companies from 2007 to 2014, this paper uses goodwill impairment as an indicator of M&A performance to examine the association between goodwill impairment and management compensation. The empirical results show that the magnitude of goodwill impairment is negatively associated with management compensation. However, the effect is concentrated in listed private firms in China. Furthermore, our results reveal that the negative association between goodwill impairment and management compensation is attenuated in firms with higher management power. In conclusion, our study suggests that the board of listed private firms in China will take goodwill impairment into consideration in designing management compensation plans. Nevertheless, management power reduces the effect of goodwill impairment on management compensation, i.e., it has a negative corporate governance effect.
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(1)商誉是并购中收购方付出的对价高于被收购方的可辨认净资产相应份额的公允价值的部分。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F272.92;F275
引用信息:
[1]卢煜,曲晓辉.商誉减值与高管薪酬——来自中国A股市场的经验证据[J].当代会计评论,2016,9(01):70-88.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重点项目“公允价值信息采集及指数构建研究”(13AJY005);; 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“国际趋同的公允价值计量模型及效果检验”(14JJD790008)的阶段性成果
2016-06-15
2016-06-15
