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本文以中证中小投资者服务中心(以下简称“投服中心”)的持股行权政策为准自然实验构建双重差分模型,利用投资者与上市公司在“上证e互动”平台上的问答记录对企业的互动信息披露质量进行度量,系统考察投服中心持股行权对企业互动式信息披露质量的影响及作用机制。研究结果表明,投服中心持股行权显著提升了企业的互动式信息披露质量。异质性分析发现,投服中心持股行权对互动式信息披露质量的影响在存在两权分离、大股东资金占用情况较严重以及管理层领取超额薪酬的企业中更明显。机制分析表明,持股行权政策对互动式信息披露质量的积极效应通过吸引更多的中小投资者参与治理并强化媒体和监管机构的外部监督力量实现。本文揭示了投服中心践行股东积极主义在保障投资者信息平权有效落实中扮演的关键角色,丰富了管理层与投资者互动信息披露的研究,还为投服中心持续推进持股行权提供了有益启示。
Abstract：This paper uses the pilot projects of the right exercise by China Securities Investor Services Center(CSISC) as a quasi-natural experiment to construct a DID model and uses the question-and-answer records between listed companies and investors on “Shanghai Stock Exchange e-Interaction” to measure the quality of interactive information disclosure. It systematically investigates the impact of the right exercise by CSISC on the quality of interactive information disclosure and its mechanisms. The results show that the exercise of rights by CSISC can improve the quality of interactive information disclosure. Heterogeneity tests suggest that the effect is more pronounced among firms with separation between ownership and control,severe tunneling by controlling shareholders, and excessive executive compensation. Channel analyses show that the right exercise by CSISC affects interactive information disclosure quality'through increasing minority investors participation in corporate governance and enhancing external oversight by the media and regulatory authorities. This study reveals the key role that CSISC plays in effectively ensuring information equity for investors by right exercise. This study contributes to the literature on information disclosure related to interaction between management'and investors, and provides valuable policy implications for the CSISCs continuous advancement of shareholder activism initiatives.
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(1)监管机构发出的函件包含关注函、问询函、警示函、监管函,是中国证券监督管理委员会及其派出机构、证券交易所等监管机构在履行市场监管职责过程中,针对上市公司、中介机构或其他市场参与主体在信息披露、公司治理、证券交易、合规经营等方面可能存在的问题,采取的不同形式的书面通知或措施。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F275;F832.51
引用信息:
[1]刘馨茗,李昕彦,钱源君,等.中小投资者保护与互动式信息披露质量——来自投服中心持股行权的证据[J].当代会计评论,2025,2(04):28-48.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金青年项目“党委审计委员会提升国家审计质量的作用机理与治理成效研究”(25CJY067); 国家自然科学基金委重点项目“数智时代的企业投融资与风险管理”(72232007)的资助
2024-08-12
2024
2025-12-15
2025
2025-10-15
2
2025-12-31
2025-12-31
